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There has been much discussion about the extent to which the jurisprudence of the EU 
courts gives adequate protection to human rights and, in particular, reflects the decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights. This article aims to add to the discussion by 
providing a review of the EU courts decisions in respect of one particular human right, 
freedom of expression, to assess the EU courts’ consistency of decision making on this 
issue and their consistency with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The review will result in a better understanding of the scope of freedom of 
expression within the European Union, as well as the weight accorded to this right. 
Further, in focussing in depth on one human right, this article will provide a detailed 
and nuanced picture of the level of protection awarded to human rights than a general 
overview might provide.
1. Introduction
The Constitution for Europe proposed that the European Union (EU) seek accession 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). If it comes into force, it 
could be seen as constituting the latest phase in the relationship between the EU 
and the ECHR. Although the status of the Constitution is unclear, it is nonetheless 
timely to consider the current level of protection awarded to human rights within 
the EU and how it corresponds with the model provided by the ECHR. This issue, 
1 Professor of Law, University of Essex.     
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which has been somewhat contentious,2 falls into two linked questions: whether the 
EU should be expected to protect human rights; and, if so, to what degree. 
Originally the EC Treaty, a trade treaty, contained no reference to human 
rights3 and it was only in the face of rebellion from a number of national courts 
that the ECJ accepted that human rights did form part of the Community legal 
order.4 Since then, the position has been recognized by treaty amendments5 and 
the subsequent introduction of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’), 
albeit non-binding. It would therefore seem that the answer to the first question 
is in the affirmative. There is, however, a history of concern about the level of 
protection awarded to human rights within the EU. Insofar as the ECHR seems 
to be the reference point for the assessment of rights protection within the EU, 
issues arose as to whether the EU courts were using the rights to justify extending 
Community competence,6 or – more neutrally – the fact that discrepancies between 
the two legal orders might arise.7 
The question that this article will address is the second question identified 
above, that is whether the substantive scope of rights within the Union legal order 
are ‘at least equal to the rights conferred by the Convention’8 as interpreted by the 
2 See famously the discussion between Coppell and O’Neill ‘The European Court: Taking Rights 
Seriously?’ 29 CML Rev (1992) 669 and Weiler and Lockhart ‘“Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: 
The European Court and Its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’ 32 CML Rev (1995) 51 and 579
3 The first reference was in the recitals to the Single European Act.
4 See e.g. Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, at p. 507; note that in early cases two 
Advocates-General stated that the ECJ is under no obligation to follow the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR: see Case 118/75 Watson v. Belmann [1976] ECR 1201 at p. 1207; Case 374/87 Orkem v. 
Germany [1989] ECR 3301, 3337-8.
5 Articles 6 and 7 TEU, following the wording of the ECJ’s jurisprudence as regards the ECHR.
6 Coppell and O’Neill, supra, at p. 669, suggest that the ECJ’s jurisprudence is masking an attempt 
to extend Community competence and its jurisdiction, but contrast views of Weiler and Lockhart, 
and also Weiler, J.H.H., ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On the Standards and 
Values in the Protection of Human Rights’ in Neuwahl and Rosas (eds) The European Union and 
Human Rights (1995).
7 See e.g. van Dijk, P. ‘Judicial Protection of Human Rights in the European Union – Divergence, 
Coordination, Integration’ Exeter Paper in European Law No. 1 (1996), at p. 15, Venice Commis-
sion Opinion 256/2003 Opinion on the Implications of a Legally-Binding Charter of Fundamental 
Rights on Human Rights Protection in Europe CDL-AD (2003) 92 Or. Eng. 18th December 2003, 
Lawson, R., ‘Confusion and conflict? Diverging Interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg’, in Lawson, R., and de Blois, M., (eds) The Dynamics 
of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Essays in Honour of Henry Schermers, volume III, 
(Martinus Nijhof Publishers 1994); Speilmann, D., ‘EU Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies and Complementarities’ in Alston et al (eds) The 
EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 1999). 
8 Venice Commission, supra, para. 32. The fact that for most Member States the ECHR constitutes a 
prior Treaty obligation would also seem to be a factor here: Grabitz, E., ‘Implementation of Human 
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European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’),9 that is, equal in scope and weight. 
‘Equal’ in this context means equivalent or comparable rather than identical,10 
though it has been suggested that the ‘result of the protection of the Convention 
rights should be the same’.11 This question of the level of protection can be looked 
at in a general or formal way, or by looking at the jurisprudence of the two court 
systems in respect of an individual right. It has been noted that the second aspect 
has been missing.12 This article reflects the latter point, as it aims to assess the 
level of protection in a particular substantive field by considering the scope of the 
freedom of expression, as well as the weight attributed to it in the EU legal order. 
Focussing on an individual right may provide a more sophisticated view of the EU 
courts’ approach to human rights. Freedom of expression has been selected for a 
number of reasons. It is a right that can be seen as embodying central democratic 
and societal concerns; it also contains a commercial element, thus reflecting some 
of the tensions inherent within the EU system itself. More pragmatically, there is 
a significant body of case law under both the EU and ECHR systems. 
This article has two elements. It will review the case law of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) (together the ‘EU courts’) in 
relation to the freedom of expression to assess the development of the jurisprudence, 
in particular whether the EU courts have been consistent in their approach. In itself, 
such a review may provide valuable information for individuals seeking to assert 
their rights to freedom of expression at the Community level, in that the scope of 
their rights will be more clearly delineated.13 Secondly, this article will compare 
the approach of the EU courts to freedom of expression with that of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to the same issue.14 
Rights in Community Law’ in In Memoriam J.D.B. Mitchell (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), 
194–210.
9 Sørensen ‘Meeting Points between the ECHR and the Law of the European Communities’ in Infor-
mation on the Court of Justice of the EC, III (1977) 41 at p. 45. See also the reasoning the ECtHR 
itself in Matthews v. UK, ECHR judgment 18 February 1999; Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 
ECHR judgment 18 February 1999. Implicit in its reasoning is the assumption that the EU is still 
the creature of the member States which remain fundamentally responsible for the Community’s 
actions – and those of the Union. The joint responsibility of the member States for the action of 
the EU has been raised a number of times since Matthews, see most recently Bosphorus Airways 
v. Ireland, ECHR judgment 30 June 2005 (GC), which concerns alleged human rights violations 
resulting from Community secondary legislation which the ECJ had upheld.
10 Bosphorus Airways, ibid., para. 155.
11 Bosphorus Airways, supra, Concurring Opinion of Judge Ress, para. 3.
12 Bosphorus Airways, supra, Concurring Opinion of Judge Ress, para. 2.
13 Clapham suggests that a ‘victim-centred’ policy towards human rights is desirable, rather than 
one which focuses on the actors: ‘A Human Rights Policy for the European Community’ 10 YBEL 
(1990) 309, at p. 365.
14 Article 11 of the Charter is the relevant provision guaranteeing freedom of expression and the 
Explanations state that ‘Article 11 corresponds to Article 10 of the European Convention of the 
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Given that the model against which we will be measuring the decisions of the 
EU courts is Article 10 ECHR, that provision will be our starting point. Despite 
considerable jurisprudence on Article 10 ECHR, it is not the intention to develop 
a detailed critical analysis of those decisions. Instead an overview will suffice to 
provide a yardstick against which the EU courts’ decisions may be measured. This 
article will then review the EU cases considering freedom of expression since 
1992, which was, broadly speaking, both the endpoint for the analysis undertaken 
by Coppell and O’Neill and the date of the Treaty on European Union, with its 
express reference to the ECHR. Some previous analyses of the jurisprudence 
have been criticized for being selective in the cases chosen or the way they were 
presented so as to further the authors’ hypothesis.15 This study does not seek to 
support any particular hypothesis, nor is it heavily theorized. It instead aims to 
provide the evidence against which such claims may be assessed. It describes the 
relevant cases in chronological order, as this would seem to be the most neutral 
framework.16 A third section will compare the EU courts’ jurisprudence with that 
of the ECtHR to assess the consistency of the EU courts with the ECHR system. 
The conclusions, in addition to providing an overall assessment of the position, 
will suggest a possible direction for future action in this field.
2. Outline of Article 10 ECHR
Freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR is not absolute: states 
may require the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises17 and 
Article 10(2) specifies the conditions upon which States may restrict freedom of 
expression. Article 10 protects a broad range of expression. It includes commercial 
as well as artistic or political ‘speech’.18 The shocking as well as the acceptable 
deserves protection.19 The essential element of freedom of expression, which 
distinguishes it from other linked rights, such as freedom of association, seems to 
European Convention on Human Rights …’ and that ‘the meaning and scope of this right are the 
same as those guaranteed by the ECHR’.
15 Notably the criticism levelled at Coppell and O’Neill by Weiler and Lockhart, supra.
16 To avoid duplication, Case C-353/99P Hautala [2001] ECR I-9565, [2002] 1 CMLR 15; and Case 
C-6/98 ARD v. ProSieben [1999] ECR I-7599 will be dealt with at the same time as cases with a 
similar factual basis.
17 Article 10(1) ECHR, last sentence.
18 Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, ECHR judgment 20 November 1989, 
Series A no. 165, pp. 19-20, para 33; Casado Coca v. Spain, ECHR judgment 24 February 1994, 
Series A no. 285; Jacubowski v. Germany, ECHR judgment of 23 June 1994, Series A no. 291-A, 
p. 14, para 26; and VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, ECHR judgment 28 June 2001, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-VI.
19 See e.g. The Observer and Guardian v. UK, ECHR judgment 26 November 1991, Series A No. 
216, (1992) 14 EHRR 153 at p. 30.
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be the communication of ideas. As such, it covers transmission as well as content, 
a point important for the mass media.20 It includes the right to receive information 
which others wish to impart, for example, a right to access newspapers which are 
generally available to the public.21 Article 10 does not provide a right to freedom 
of information independent of others’ rights to communicate, although the Council 
of Europe recognizes the importance of freedom of information to freedom of 
expression.22 
Many of the cases arising before the ECJ concern broadcasting regulation, as 
commercial sector broadcasters use freedom of expression arguments to challenge 
national broadcasting regulation. Article 10(1) ECHR recognizes that certain regula-
tion of the mass media is acceptable, for example for ‘technical reasons, or in the 
interests of ensuring diversity and pluralism’.23 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
has, however, limited states’ freedom to regulate.24 Although the reason justifying 
the regulatory system need not correspond to any of the aims in Article 10(2),25 the 
ECtHR will review the appropriateness and necessity of the national measure.26 As 
a result, States have been required to abandon monopoly broadcasting systems27 
and they are under positive obligations to facilitate28 freedom of expression both in 
terms of licensing requirements and access to airtime.29 The extent of these obliga-
20 Autronic AG v. Switzerland, ECHR judgment 22 May 1990, Series A, no. 178.
21 Sunday Times v. UK, ECHR judgment 26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, (1992) 14 EHRR 
229.
22 See e.g. Council of Ministers’ Recommendation No. R (2002) 2 on Access to Official Documents; 
Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1506 (2001) on Freedom of Expression and Information 
in the Media in Europe.
23 Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria, ECHR judgment 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, (1994) 
16 EHRR 93, Hins and Hagenholtz v. the Netherlands, application no. 25987/94, decision of 8 
March 1996, DR 84-A, p. 146.
24 Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, ECHR judgment 28 March 1990, Series A, no. 173, para 61, 
Autronic AG v. Switzerland, ECHR judgment 22 May 1990, Series A, no. 178., para 52, Lentia, 
supra, para 29.
25 Demuth v. Switzerland, ECHR,judgment 5 November 2002, para 33. Contrast view of the Commis-
sion of the European Union in an early Green Paper: ‘Television without Frontiers’ Green Paper 
on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, especially by Satellite and Cable, 
COM (84) 300 final, 14 June 1984.
26 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed) 
(Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 580; contrast Groppera Radio, supra, and United Christian 
Broadcasting Ltd v. UK, 7 November 2000, in which the State was held not to have exceeded its 
margin of appreciation.
27 Lentia, supra. Contrast earlier Sacchi decision.
28 Positive obligations have also in arisen in other circumstances: note the ruling against the UK for 
failing to prevent high damages awards: see e.g. Tolstoy v. UK, ECHR judgment 13 July 1995, 
Series A no. 323, (1995) 20 EHRR 442.
29 Tierfabriken, supra.
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tions is unclear. They would not seem to give an individual (or company) the right 
to demand a particular licence30 and early decisions of the Commission show that 
Article 10 does not include the unfettered right to airtime.31 It is unclear whether 
the ECtHR generally sees such regulation as not constituting an interference with 
freedom of expression under Article 10(1), or constituting a justified interference, 
though the latter is the more likely possibility.
Given the breadth of Article 10(1), much of the jurisprudence has focussed on 
Article 10(2). Whereas Article 10(1) may be seen as determining the scope of the 
right, Article 10(2) concerns the weight to be attributed to it when in conflict with 
other interests. Article 10(2) provides a three stage test against which State action 
is measured:
 1. is there a legitimate aim as stated in Article 10(2), or the last line of Article 
10(1);
 2. is the restriction necessary in a democratic society; and
 3. is the restriction prescribed by law.
The ECtHR usually accepts a State’s assessment of the legitimate aim, reserving 
more detailed scrutiny for other aspects of Article 10(2). The central question is 
whether the restriction is necessary in a democratic society, that is, whether it 
answers a ‘pressing social need’.32 Necessity has been linked with proportionality, 
which occurs in many legal systems including the EU, albeit in slightly different 
forms. Proportionality has a number of elements: whether the measure is appropriate 
to achieve its stated aim; and whether no other, less intrusive effective measure is 
available. Sometimes a third element can be seen: is the measure proportionate to 
its aim?33 The ECtHR has not always been consistent in how it sees proportionality34 
and different factual circumstances might mean a different outcome, even with the 
application of the same test.35 
Article 10(2) is a mechanism to find a balance between the freedom of expression 
and the interest the State is seeking to protect.36 In this assessment the importance 
of freedom of expression may be considered,37 as well as the importance of the 
30 Tele 1 Privatfernsehgesellschaft mbH v. Austria, ECHR, judgment 21 September 2000.
31 X and Association of Z v. UK, Application no. 4515/70, Coll. 38 (1972), 86, 88.
32 Handyside v. UK, Series A, no. 24, para. 48.
33 Lingens v. Austria, ECHR judgment 8 July 1986, Series A No. 103, (1986) 8 EHRR 407, at paragraph 
40.
34 Van Dijk and van Hoof, supra, at p. 81.
35 McBride, J., ‘Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Ellis, E., (ed) 
The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 1999). 
36 See e.g. Brogan, Series A. no. 145-B p. 27.
37 E.g. Sunday Times, supra.
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conflicting policy goal.38 The type and level of intrusion are also relevant. Certainly 
the ECtHR has noted when the effect of the measure is to eliminate the substance of 
a person’s right entirely, rather than just limit its exercise.39 The approach adopted 
to the relative weighting of freedom of expression and the competing interests 
by the ECtHR on the one hand and the EU courts on the other are likely to prove 
crucial in any assessment of whether the EU courts are awarding protection ‘at 
least equal’ to that of the ECtHR.
The ECtHR reserves to itself the position of final arbiter of a measure’s accept-
ability in a given case. It does allow a certain ‘margin of appreciation’ regarding the 
assessment of the need for a restriction or the most appropriate way to achieve that 
goal, thereby introducing some flexibility into the proportionality assessment.40 This 
is understandable: the doctrine of margin of appreciation is a way of managing dif-
ference between the various signatory States and also a recognition that the national 
authorities might be in a better position than the ECtHR to assess the position. The 
difficulty is that, not only does the use of the doctrine tip the balance in favour of 
the State seeking to impose the restriction,41 but the margin of appreciation is a 
vague concept and in some cases States’ choices are subject to a greater level of 
scrutiny than in others.42 It seems that a number of factors may affect the scope of 
the margin of appreciation: the type of speech; the aim protected;43 the degree of 
‘common ground’ between the states; and the seriousness of the interference. One 
issue that might arise is whether the doctrine of the margin of appreciation can be 
transposed to the EU, given the different relationship between the EU courts and 
the national legal orders.
According to the ECtHR, there is little scope for restrictions on political speech, 
especially where the criticism relates to a government rather than a private individual 
or even a politician.44 Commercial speech receives less attention,45 even when it 
may arguably affect the public interest. Indeed, in some circumstances the differ-
ence between commercial speech and other speech in the public interest may be 
38 Albeit not in the context of Article 10 ECHR, the weight of competing policy objectives can be 
seen in the Diane Pretty case, which concerned a blanket ban on assisted suicide: Pretty v. UK, 
ECHR judgment 29 April 2002, (2002) 35 EHRR 1, para 74.
39 See e.g. Hertel v. Switzerland, ECHR judgment 25 August 1998, (1998) 28 EHRR 534.
40 Macdonald, R., StJ., ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ in Macdonald et al. (eds) The European System 
for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1993).
41 Van Dijk and van Hoof, supra, 585-606; MacBride, supra, 29–30.
42 Contrast Lentia, supra n.18 with United Christian Broadcaster, supra.
43 There may be a greater degree of freedom where a State is balancing competing Convention rights: 
see e.g. Sales, P., and Hooper, B., ‘Proportionality and the Form of Law’ 119 LQR (2003) 426 at 
436
44 Okcuoglu v. Turkey, ECHR judgment 8 July 1999 at paragraph 46.
45 Markt Intern, supra, but c.f. Tierfabriken, supra n. 13, Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG v. Austria, 
ECHR judgment 11 December 2003. 
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difficult to define. This issue may be even more significant in the context of the 
European Union, given its trade-based origins and the importance of advertising for 
the creation of the internal market. In Handyside,46 the United Kingdom sought to 
protect public morals, an area where there are often many differences between the 
States. Here, the States seem to have a wide margin of appreciation. Similarly, in 
Otto Preminger,47 the ECtHR recognized that, given the different attitudes towards 
religion in the various States, the authorities have a wide margin of appreciation 
in taking action to protect individuals’ religious sensibilities, which fall within the 
scope of Article 10(2) as part of the ‘rights of others’. Issues of national security 
are also perceived as sensitive.48 It should be noted that the ECtHR itself has not 
developed complete or consistent analysis of the use of the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation and has been subject, in cases such as Otto Preminger, to some 
criticism in this context.49 Insofar as the doctrine may be transposed, a lack of clarity 
here might give rise to difficulties in application for the EU courts.
Freedom of expression is awarded to everyone; it is not restricted to citizens. 
Indeed, it is not restricted to natural persons; despite conceptual difficulties with 
this position, companies have benefitted from Article 10 in the same way as people 
have.50 This is a point that has particular relevance in the broadcasting sphere, as 
many (if not all) broadcasting licences tend to be held by bodies corporate rather 
than corporeal. 
The ECtHR has accepted that, although public servants have a right to freedom of 
expression, it is not unlimited. Article 10(2) refers to the duties and responsibilities 
in exercising freedom of expression. Civil servants, in particular, are under a duty 
of loyalty to the state as noted in the case of Vogt.51 Nonetheless, civil servants are 
persons who, in principle, should benefit from Article 10. The competing interests 
should therefore be balanced.52 This line of cases has been the subject of some 
criticism.53 Certainly when civil servants are dismissed for expressing political 
opinions, one might question whether the requirement of proportionality has really 
been satisfied. By contrast, in Fuentes Bobo,54 which did not concern a civil servant, 
the dismissal of an employee for making televised statements that were critical of 
46 Handyside, supra.
47 Otto Preminger Institute v. Austria, ECHR judgment 20 September 1994, Series A No. 295-A, 
(1995) 19 EHRR 34.
48 See e.g. Zana v. Turkey, ECHR judgment 25 November 1997; cf. Okcuoglu, supra.
49 Van Dijk and van Hoof, supra, p. 87 et seq.
50 See e.g. Autronic, supra.
51 Vogt v. Germany, ECHR judgment 26 September 1995, Series A No. 323, (1996) 21 EHRR 205
52 Ibid., para. 53.
53 See e.g. Vickers, L., ‘The Protection of Freedom of Political Opinion in Employment’ EHRLR 
(2002) 468.
54 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, ECHR judgment 29 February 2000, (2001) 31 EHRR 50.
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the employer was found to be disproportionate. Although issues of responsibility 
apply to all, and in some cases have given rise to comments about the need for 
compliance with journalistic ethics, in practice it seems that otherwise the duties 
and responsibilities noted in Article 10(2) do not have much impact on the ECtHR’s 
assessment of the permissibility of government action under Article 10. 
Overall, the ECtHR has given a broad scope and a heavy weight to freedom of 
expression. Under the ECHR jurisprudence, political speech in particular, is hard 
to outweigh. How have cases within the EU fared?
3. Review of the Jurisprudence of the European 
Courts
There have been 15 cases55 during the review period in which freedom of expression 
arises, including those cases where the issue is discussed only by the Advocate 
General. The first is TV10,56 which concerned the question of whether broadcast-
ers established in another member State but aiming their programming at the 
Netherlands should have to comply with Dutch regulation. The referring court 
questioned whether restrictions on receiving such services were compatible with 
Articles 10 and 14 ECHR. The ECJ followed earlier decisions in the broadcasting 
field,57 accepting that regulation protected pluralism and diversity.58 Its assessment 
of the compatibility of the Dutch laws with Article 10 ECHR and Community law 
was brief and the judgment was finally based on principles relating to the freedom 
to provide services. The Advocate-General had looked at the matter more closely, 
noting that the, ‘Court of Justice has invariably held back from applying in practice 
the general legal principles defined in the European Convention’.59 
He implied that in previous cases the ECJ had thought that no relevant ECHR 
jurisprudence existed. The Advocate-General referred to Groppera,60 as well as a 
decision of the Commission of Human Rights concerning the same laws as in issue 
here, Cable Music Europe v. Netherlands.61 Cable Music Europe dealt with and 
dismissed the argument that these rules violated Article 10 or that there had been 
discrimination in the restrictions imposed on the broadcaster. Given this case law 
55 A further case came before the EFTA court concerning broadcasting and the right to restrict broadcast 
pornography: Case E-8/97 TV1000 Sverige AB v. Norway, EFTA Court judgment 12 June 1998. 
Cases in which a freedom of expression argument has been raised but not addressed by either the 
Advocate-General or the court are not included.
56 Case C-23/93 TV10 SA v. Commisaariat voor de Media [1994] ECR I-14795.
57 Case C-353/89 Commission v. the Netherlands (Mediawet) [1991] ECR I-4069.
58 TV10, supra, para. 25.
59 Ibid., para. 84.
60 Groppera Radio, supra, especially para. 73.
61 Cable Music, Application No. 1803/91, Commission Decision.
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on clearly similar facts, the Advocate-General concluded that there was no ‘reason 
to doubt the proposed solution to this case from the point of view of Community 
law’.62 This statement constitutes a rare example of the Community legal system, 
albeit in the form of the Advocate-General, applying ECHR case-law directly. This 
rarity might be explained by the fact that cases involving exactly the same rules arise 
infrequently; it does not explain why the ECJ did not take the same approach.63 
Two cases64 concern access to information, potentially expanding the scope of 
protection granted by freedom of expression. In both cases there were passing refer-
ences in the opinion of the Advocate-General to the fact that freedom of expression 
encompasses freedom of information. In neither case was the point determinative 
in the reasoning of the Advocate-General, nor was the issue picked up at all by the 
ECJ.65 Article 10 ECHR does not constitute a free-standing right to information, 
a fact which Advocate-General Leger noted in Hautala, the more recent of the 
two cases.66 He then continued to argue that although international instruments, 
including the ECHR, may not provide an unambiguous link between freedom of 
information and freedom of expression, ‘convergence of the constitutional tradition 
of the Member States may suffice in order to establish the existence of one of [the 
general] principles’.67 
This is a link back to early case law which shows that the ECHR, although 
significant for the EU, is not the only potential source of inspiration for the EU 
courts in identifying the nature and scope of the rights protected by the Union legal 
order. Interestingly, the Union does provide for a right of access to public documents 
in the interests of improving democratic accountability of the institutions. 
Familiapress 68 concerned a prohibition on the inclusion of prize competitions in 
journals. The Austrian government argued that the rule had been introduced to help 
maintain diversity of the press. The ECJ accepted that such an aim could justify a 
restriction on the free movement of goods,69 but that any provision of national law 
restricting free movement of goods must be proportionate to the objective pursued 
62 TV10, supra, Opinion para. 89.
63 One might perhaps suggest that the ECJ did not want to refer to a Commission decision; this is not 
convincing as the ECJ’s judgment contained no reference to Article 10 ECHR at all.
64 Case C-58/94 The Netherlands v. Council [1996] ECR I-2169, in which the Advocate-General 
based the link between freedom of expression and freedom of information on Council of Europe 
recommendations rather than ECtHR jurisprudence, para. 16; Case C-353/99P Council v. Hautala, 
supra.
65 The ECJ in Case C-58/94, ibid., linked the right to access information to general concerns regarding 
democracy.
66 Hautala, supra, para. 61.
67 Ibid., para. 68.
68 Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-und vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer 
Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689.
69 Ibid., para. 18.
fReeDom of exPRessIoN IN The euRoPeAN uNIoN 381
and, ‘must not be capable of being achieved by measures which are less restrictive 
of intra-Community trade’.70 
Further, limitations on EC Treaty freedoms must be assessed in the light of 
fundamental rights. The ECJ then considered the issue from the perspective of 
ECHR jurisprudence, noting that freedom of expression was not unlimited provided 
the conditions in Article 10(2) were met. The ECJ concluded that the question 
before it was whether a national measure aimed at ensuring the diversity of the 
press such as the Austrian measure is proportionate to its aim and, ‘whether that 
objective might not be attained by measures less restrictive both intra-Community 
trade and freedom of expression’.71 
The ECJ highlighted that there were less intrusive mechanisms to achieve the 
same end, for example blacking out the relevant page or stipulating that Austrian 
readers do not qualify for a prize72. It seems the measure was disproportionate, 
although the EC did not rule on this issue as the final assessment was one for the 
national courts. Although the ECJ recognized freedom of expression, the value 
ascribed to that right here is unclear. In particular, should the proportionality test 
consider the impact of the national measure on inter-State trade, or on trade and 
freedom of expression? The issue of whether proportionality should be assessed 
against the public interest objective or against the impact of the national measure 
on trade recurs through the jurisprudence of the EU courts, and has given rise to 
some criticism.
Montecatini was an appeal from a decision of the CFI. This case concerned a 
cartel, the members of which held a number of meetings to set prices. Montecatini 
argued that the finding of the CFI was that the meetings themselves were per se 
illegal under the terms of Article 81, which ignored freedom of expression and 
freedom of association. The ECJ’s response to this argument was brief. After re-
iterating that these rights are protected in the Community legal order, it held
‘…that the meetings of the polypropylene producers were not held to be contrary 
to Article [81(1)] of the Treaty per se, but only inasmuch as their purpose was 
anti-competitive …. It follows that [this argument] cannot be upheld either.’73
Unsurprisingly, the appeal was unsuccessful; the fact that this argument was not the 
applicants’ strongest claim may have been the cause of the ECJ’s lack of analysis 
70 Ibid., para. 19.
71 Familiapress, supra, para. 27, see also para. 34.
72 This would constitute direct discrimination on grounds of nationality, however, a point the ECJ 
did not consider.
73 Case C-235/92P Montecatini SpA v. Commission [1999] ECR I-4539, paras. 138–139.
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on this point,74 although as we shall see below, the ECJ’s reasoning does raise some 
concerns about its approach to rights protection.
The Tobacco Advertising case,75 which concerned Germany’s challenge to 
the enactment of a directive prohibiting the advertising of tobacco products, was 
another judicial review action. It was argued that the directive constituted an 
infringement of freedom of expression. In assessing the proportionality of a restric-
tion, the Advocate-General suggested that a stricter standard be used in relation 
to fundamental rights than is used in relation to assessing the proportionality of 
Community acts in other contexts, i.e. that the least impact test should be used rather 
than reasonable behaviour usually used in judicial review situations.76 By contrast 
to some of the other cases involving the proportionality of Community actions, the 
Advocate-General recognized, as the ECtHR suggested in Handyside,77 that we 
are not looking for a measure that is reasonable, but a measure we really cannot do 
without. The ECJ did not address the point at all. Ultimately the Advocate-General 
and the ECJ came to the same conclusion; that the measure was invalid, although 
by different routes. This assessment of the law, by the Advocate-General is very 
close to the Strasbourg position; the ECJ’s disregard for the freedom of expression 
argument much less so.
One of the fullest discussions of freedom of expression came in Connolly. Con-
nolly worked for the Commission. Staff regulations required officials to abstain 
from any public expression which reflected on the official’s position.78 They further 
specified that officials should not publish any matter dealing with the work of the 
Communities, save with express prior permission.79 Connolly published such a book, 
without permission. The views expressed in the book, which received a significant 
amount of publicity, contradicted the central policies espoused by the Community. 
Connolly was dismissed for non-compliance with staff regulations. He appealed 
against this decision before the CFI challenging the compatibility of the restrictions 
74 The Commission’s investigative powers have been challenged on the basis of fundamental rights 
on numerous occasions. See e.g. Riley, A., ‘Saunders and the Power to Obtain Information in the 
European Community and United kingdom Competition Law’ (2000) 25 ELRev 264. In Joined 
Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03R Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akros Chemicals Ltd [2003] nyr, 
an action for interim measures, freedom of expression was raised in the context of privileged 
communications between lawyer and client, but not addressed.
75 Case C-376/98 Germany v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Tobacco 
Advertising Directive) [2000] ECR 1-8419. The prohibition on advertising has given rise to more 
challenges but these have been unsuccessful on procedural grounds; see further below.
76 Ibid., para. 159.
77 In Handyside, supra, the ECtHR held that ‘necessary’ ‘is not synonymous with “indispensable”, 
neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “reasonable” or 
“desirable”’, para. 48.
78 Article 12 Staff Regulations.
79 Article 17 Staff Regulations.
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on publications with Article 10 ECHR. In rejecting his argument, the CFI, pointed 
out that although freedom of expression is a fundamental right,
‘fundamental rights do not constitute an unfettered prerogative but may be subject 
to restrictions, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of 
general public interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with 
regard to the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference 
which infringes upon the very substance of the right protected.’80 
It noted that the provision was limited in terms of the material affected and that 
permission could only be refused where the publication would be likely to prejudice 
the Communities’ interests. It also commented that Article 17 was designed as 
a preventative measure, both to protect the Communities’ interests and to make 
disciplinary actions unnecessary.81
Connolly appealed to the ECJ. After emphasizing the significance of freedom 
of expression and its role as an essential foundation of a democratic society, the 
ECJ noted that Article 10(2) ECHR permits certain limitations on freedom of 
expression, although these exceptions must be interpreted restrictively. Following 
ECHR jurisprudence,82 the ECJ identified the three-stage test used by the ECtHR 
in assessing Article 10(2).83 The ECJ further noted that prior restrictions deserve 
particular consideration.84 It then held that, in principle, Community employees 
retained their freedom of expression85 but noted that public servants could nonethe-
less be expected to be under some obligations to preserve the relationship of trust 
between the institution and employee, though the scope of these obligations would 
vary depending on an individual’s place in the hierarchy. In terms of the exceptions 
permitted by Article 10(2) ECHR, the ECJ referred to the ‘rights of others’,86 and 
noted that in such cases the relevant national authorities would enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation in assessing the proportionality of the impugned measure. 
The ECJ emphasized the extremity of the views expressed in this case and that 
Connolly was a high-ranking official who had expressed views contrary to the 
policy which he was entrusted to carry out. Taking these factors into account, the 
appeal was dismissed. By contrast to the CFI’s judgment, which seems to give little 
weight to freedom of expression, there are strong similarities to the approach of the 
ECHR in the civil servants cases to which the ECJ, indeed, referred. Connolly has 
80 Case C-274/99P Connolly v. Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, para. 148 of CFI judgment quoted 
by ECJ, para. 19.
81 Ibid., para. 153 CFI judgment.
82 Wille v. Liechtenstein, ECHR judgment 28 October 1999, (2000) 30 EHRR 58.
83 Connolly, supra, para. 41.
84 Connolly, supra, ECJ judgment, paras. 41 and 42.
85 Ibid., para. 43.
86 Connolly, supra, para. 46.
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been cited in subsequent case law regarding the scope of freedom of expression 
the employees of Community institutions (see further below).87
De Coster concerned a tax imposed on the installation of satellite dishes and, 
consequently, the right to receive information which was decided on the basis of a 
restriction to provide services. It can be seen as a thinly reasoned judgment from 
many perspectives. Notably, the ECJ did not consider freedom of expression at 
all; the Advocate General touched on the issue, but fleetingly and at the end of his 
opinion, as a general additional point. It did not seem to add to his conclusions in 
the matter; indeed the ECHR case law he referred to was not the most relevant to 
the facts in issue.
Like Connolly, Cwic 88 concerns the right of a Commission employee to publish, 
in this case the text of a speech, against the wishes of the relevant Commissioner. 
The Commission’s argument was that the article presented a point of view which did 
not reflect that of the Commission. Cwic’s internal appeals were unsuccessful and 
he brought an action before the CFI, challenging the Commission’s interpretation 
of Regulation 17 of the staff regulations (detailed in Connolly) and in particular 
what is required by the interests of the Community. The CFI found for Cwic, not 
accepting the preventative function of Regulation 17. This is in marked contrast to 
its approach in Connolly. In particular, it held that a difference of opinion between 
the Commission and an official cannot justify restricting freedom of expression; 
such a difference would not necessarily prejudice the interests of the Community 
within the terms of Regulation 17. 
The Commission appealed, arguing that the interpretation of Regulation 17 
was too restrictive (or allowed too much freedom of expression). In rejecting 
this appeal, the ECJ relied heavily on its judgment in Connolly, emphasizing that 
restrictions on a right so fundamental to a democratic society should be interpreted 
narrowly and a real threat rather than a hypothetical risk to the interests of the 
Community must be shown to justify a restriction. Interestingly, in its judgment 
the ECJ did not refer to ECtHR jurisprudence, but to its own earlier decision. 
By contrast, the Advocate-General referred to ECHR jurisprudence, albeit not 
that on public servants. Rather, he focussed on the case law of the ECtHR as to 
whether abstract risks may justify a limitation on freedom of speech. Assessing 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence to allow both prior restrictions and hypothetical risks, 
the Advocate-General concluded that,
 ‘… the Convention acts as a lowest common denominator as to the substance 
of fundamental rights and that there is nothing to preclude the European Union, 
87 Case T-82/99 Cwik v. Commission [2000] ECR-SC-I-A-155, on appeal Case C-340/00P Commission 
v. Cwic [2003] ECR I-10269; Case T-76/03 Meister v. OHIM, CFI judgment 28 October 2004, on 
appeal to ECJ as Case C-12/05P.
88 Case T-82/99 Cwik v. Commission on appeal Case C-340/00P Commission v. Cwic, ibid.
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like the parties to the Convention, from providing itself with a higher level of 
protection’.89
Although the jurisprudence of the ECtHR does indeed allow prior restraints, it is 
usually only with great scrutiny. The jurisprudence referred to on hypothetical risk 
concerned the functioning of the judicial system, an area which the ECtHR has 
tended to treat with some sensitivity. Whether such an approach is right or wrong 
is one question, whether that approach can be generalized to other areas of policy 
is another. Using this case law as a comparison is therefore problematic, especially 
when case law involving public servants does exist. In Vogt, the question of risk 
to a democratic society was discussed, the risk being found unproven.90 For these 
reasons, the assessment of the Advocate-General may be a trifle harsh.
Cwic is interesting for another reason. The difference between the approach of 
the ECJ and the CFI in this case is not marked, by stark contrast to the approach 
in Connolly. We can thus see the CFI’s jurisprudence in this particular regard 
developing, though it must be emphasized that the development takes place within 
the context of Community case law rather than that of the ECHR.
Schmidberger 91 raised the question of how the conflict between EC Treaty free 
movement rights – here the free movement of goods protected by Article 28 – and 
freedom of expression can be resolved, an issue that has given rise to some comment 
already.92 In previous cases involving public protest affecting the import and export 
of goods, freedom of expression was not discussed.93 This case concerned a public 
protest about the impact of road transport on the environment, which resulted in the 
closure of the main trans-Alpine routes between Austria and Italy. Schmidberger 
brought an action against the Austrian state for failure to take action against the 
protest, which resulted in delays to intra-Community transport.94 Following the 
approach of the Advocate-General, the ECJ found that there had been a restriction 
of inter-State trade, by the Austrian decision not to stop the protest, but that the 
decision of the Austrian authorities might be justified.95 It also re-affirmed the point 
that national derogating measures must be compatible with human rights to comply 
with Community law. Although national authorities enjoyed a wide margin of 
89 Case C-340/00P Commission v. Cwic, supra. Opinion of the Advocate-General, para. 29.
90 Vogt, supra, judgment paras. 59–60.
91 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria [2003] 
ECR I-5659.
92 See e.g. Barnard and Hare, ‘The Right to Protest and the Right to Export: Police Discretion and the 
Free Movement of Goods’ 60 M.L.R. (1997) 394; Butterman, ‘European it Union: Free Movement 
of Goods versus Human Rights Protection’ 21 NQHR (2003) 527.
93 Case C-265/95 Commission v. France (Angry Farmers) [1997] ECR I-6959.
94 Article 28 in conjunction with Article 10 EC requires Member States to take action to remove 
barriers to intra-Community trade: see Case C-265/95 Angry Farmers, ibid.
95 Schmidberger, supra, para. 74, paras. 84–89.
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discretion to assess whether a fair balance has been struck between the competing 
interests, the ECJ held that it must ensure any restriction;
‘placed upon intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of the legitimate 
objective pursued, namely, in the present case, the protection of fundamental 
rights’.96 
In such a case, the motives of the protesters were not relevant: it was the motives of 
the member State that would be under review. Although Schmidberger’s challenge 
to the Austrian decision did not succeed, one might question the value attributed 
to freedom of expression here. On the one hand proportionality is assessed against 
public interest objectives; nonetheless here it seems that freedom of expression is 
protected only indirectly.
Television arose again in the context of television advertising and the Television 
without Frontiers Directive (TWFD)97 in RTL. Whereas in the previous broadcasting 
cases, Article 10 was used to justify member States’ regulation, here it was used 
to challenge member States’ regulation of advertising and to protect freedom of 
commercial speech. The questions referred concerned the interpretation on the 
rules relating to advertising frequency contained in Article 11 TWFD. RTL argued 
that the rules should be interpreted to allow broadcasters to insert more frequent 
commercial breaks during films made for television; there were no countervailing 
artistic rights in the film to set against the broadcaster’s rights since the films were 
structured with advertising breaks in mind. The Advocate-General, in dealing with 
this argument, made two points. He commented first that he, ‘was not convinced 
that the regulation of television advertising will necessarily and in all cases involve 
a restriction on the fundamental rights of broadcasters and producers to freedom of 
expression and artistic freedom’, though this point was not developed; secondly, on 
the basis that such regulation did constitute an interference, it could be justified in 
the interests of viewers.98 When considering whether the measure was proportionate, 
the Advocate-General did not address what the appropriate test of proportionality 
would be in this context.99 In coming to the conclusion that the regulation was not 
disproportionate, the Advocate-General highlighted the margin of appreciation 
96 Ibid., para. 82.
97 Council Directive 89/552/EEC as amended by 97/36/EC.
98 Case C-245/01 RTL Television GmbH v. Niedersächsische Landesmedienanstalten für privaten 
Rundfunk, judgment 23 October 2003, Opinion, para. 38.
99 Ibid., Opinion, paras. 52-3. Consider the relationship between proportionality and the margin 
of appreciation noted earlier, but contrast the opinion of the Advocate-General in the Tobacco 
Advertising case: supra. 
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allowed to states when regulating commercial speech and advertising in particular100 
by reference ECHR jurisprudence.101 
Article 11 TWFD had been considered by the Advocate-General in the light of 
Article 10 ECHR previously, in ProSieben, but not in as much depth. In ProSieben, 
the ECJ dealt with the matter by referring to the main purpose of the TWFD; that 
is, the freedom to provide services, discounting the freedom of expression issues, 
despite the fact that the recitals do contain a reference to Article 10 ECHR.102 
Given the similarity of the subject matter between ProSieben and RTL, one might 
have thought that the ECJ would similarly disregard the freedom of expression 
issues in RTL. In RTL, however, the ECJ did refer to Article 10 ECHR, as well 
as to Article 11(2) of the Charter. In this RTL might be thought a progression on 
ProSieben, perhaps as a consequence of the introduction of the Charter. The ECJ 
concluded that the limitation on advertising ‘may amount to a restriction on the 
freedom of expression’ but ‘appears, however, to be justified under Article 10(2) of 
the ECHR’.103 The ECJ accepted the need to protect consumers and cultural policy 
objectives as falling within the scope of Article 10(2), presumably as the rights of 
others, a category of interest which the ECtHR has seen quite broadly. In identifying 
these aims, the ECJ referred to its own jurisprudence in the broadcasting field, rather 
than any ECHR cases, and did not appear to recognize that it had previously104 
seen cultural policy objectives as forming part of freedom of expression. The ECJ 
pointed out that broadcasters remained free to determine content, timing and length 
of advertising breaks, thus implying that the rules were proportionate; the right to 
advertise was not entirely extinguished.105 As had the Advocate-General, the ECJ 
noted the margin of appreciation accruing in the commercial field to determine 
that the regulations were justified.106 Nonetheless, the approach in this case broadly 
parallels that taken under the ECHR.
Lindqvist concerned the liability of a woman who included personal details of her 
co-workers on her web-page without their consent. Linqvist could be seen as being 
in a similar category to cases such as RTL and to a lesser extent Karner, in that it 
involves human rights arguments in the interpretation of Community secondary 
measures; here, the Data Protection Directive (DPD). The freedom of expression 
argument was used to suggest a narrow interpretation of the DPD, allowing greater 
freedom to make statements about other people and also to provide services. It is, 
100 RTL, supra, para. 54.
101 Casado Coca v. Spain, ECHR judgment of 24 February 1994, Reports Series A No 285.
102 Not all advertising cases have raised freedom of expression arguments: see e.g. Case C-322/01 
Deutscher Apothekerverband, judgment 11 December 2003.
103 RTL, supra, para. 68–69.
104 See e.g. Case C-353/92 Commission v. Netherlands (Mediawet) [1991] ECR I-4069. 
105 Contrast the Tobacco Advertising case, supra; see also Hertel supra.
106 RTL, supra, para. 73.
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however, a case in which the right to a private life, protected by Article 8 ECHR 
and which the DPD aims to protect, weighed on the other side of the argument. 
Although the Advocate-General did not consider it necessary to consider freedom 
of expression, the ECJ did, constituting a reversal of the more usual position. The 
ECJ highlighted the level of rights protection in the EU, citing Connolly,107 but 
then left it to the national court to balance the competing interests, always in the 
light of the principle of proportionality with its multiple meanings.108 No further 
guidance to the referring court was given; there was certainly no detailed analysis 
of Article 10 or its case-law. 
More recently in Karner,109 Austrian rules which prohibited certain advertise-
ments were challenged for their compatibility with the Misleading Advertising 
Directive,110 as well as Articles 28 and 49 EC. The ECJ concluded that none of 
these provisions precluded the Austrian rules. The ECJ then considered freedom 
of expression. It re-emphasized the fact that the Community legal order protects 
human rights as recognized by the ECHR; it also noted that, following Kremzow,111 
the ECJ must, where the national legislation falls within the field of application 
of Community law, give the national court all the guidance as to interpretation 
necessary to enable it to assess the compatibility of the national legislation with 
human rights, something which as we have seen, it has not always done. The 
ECJ continued by paraphrasing the scope of Article 10 ECHR, citing Community 
cases,112 and noted that the level of discretion enjoyed by national authorities varied 
depending on the circumstances. It held:
‘[w]hen the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion of 
public interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which the Member States 
have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited to an examination of the 
reasonableness and proportionality of the interference. This holds true for the 
commercial use of freedom of expression, particularly in a field as complex and 
fluctuating as advertising.’113 
107 Connolly, supra. 
108 Case C-101/01 Lindqvist, judgment 6 November 2003, [2004] 1 CMLR 20, para. 87.
109 Case C-71/02 Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk GesmbH, judgment 25 
March 2004.
110 Council Directive 84/450/EEC, OJ [1984] L 250/17, as amended by Directive 97/55/EC OJ [1997] 
L 290/18.
111 Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629.
112 Familiapress, supra, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, and Schmidberger, supra.
113 Karner, supra, judgment para. 51, citing RTL, as well as Markt Intern Verlag and Tierfabriken, 
supra.
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In concluding that the restrictions were proportionate, the ECJ seems to have 
adopted a different approach to the assessment of proportionality than that suggested 
by Advocate-General Jacobs in the context of judicial review actions. 
Congres National du Kurdistan114 is the first in a series of cases challenging 
Union (and Community) action,115 some of which have yet to be decided.116 As these 
have on the whole be declared as inadmissible, they should not form part of this 
review and indeed, no further factual detail will be given. It should be noted that 
they do raise questions as to the formal, rather than substantive, level of protection 
awarded to freedom of expression. A similar concern with the general status of 
rights, as well as their substantive scope can be seen in Meister.117 This is another 
staff case. In this instance, Meister complained of his re-assignment, arguing that 
his assignment took place not for the reasons given but because of his objections 
to the re-organization of OHIM, which he expressed in a letter. The CFI decided 
the case, broadly in the Commission’s favour. On the facts of the case, because 
an improper motive had not been found, the CFI did not a violation of Article 10. 
Meister appealed. Amongst other grounds, he has put forward the argument that 
the CFI made an error in law ‘in failing to make a clear statement on the scope of 
the right to freedom of expression’.118
4. Themes and Comparison of Jurisprudence
In the Introduction, it was suggested that there are two ways of considering the 
equivalence of protection of human rights between the EU and ECHR: that of 
looking at protection generally considering the interrelationship between the two 
systems, as well as access to justice; and that focussing on specific substantive 
issues. Although this survey has focussed on one particular substantive area so as 
to address the second level of protection, it is impossible to avoid questions relating 
to more general issues too. In assessing the jurisprudence of the EU courts, then, 
this article will consider general issues before looking at the substantive scope and 
weight of freedom of expression within the EU legal order, as well as permitted 
derogations from freedom of expression. This analysis may allow us to see the 
114 Case T-206/02 Congres National du Kurdistan v. Council of the European Union, CFI, judgment 
15 February 2005.
115 Case T-310/03 R Kreuzer Medien GmbH v. European Parliament and Council, CFI judgment, 21 
September 2004; Case T-321/02 Vannieuwenhuyze-Morin v. European Parliament, CFI judgment, 
6 May 2003. 
116 Case T-327/03 Stichting Al-Aqsa v. Council and Commission; Case T-13/04 Bonde et al. v. European 
Parliament and Council; Case T-253/04 Aydar and others v. Council. There is also one preliminary 
ruling: Case C-479/04 Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet.
117 Case T-76/03 Meister v. OHIM, supra.
118 Case C-12/05, supra.
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relationship between different values within the EU, which in turn may return 
us to general questions about the relationship of the EU to other systems of law, 
as well as the prior question of whether the EU should be regarded as protecting 
human rights.
Generally, human rights arguments seem now more common: in Sacchi,119 an 
early broadcasting case concerning a state monopoly broadcaster, there was no 
mention of freedom of expression. By contrast, recent cases on broadcasting120 
show Article 10 being referred to regularly and sometimes by both sides to the 
dispute.121 The EU courts, and in particular some Advocates-General, appear more 
comfortable referring to the case-law of the ECtHR as time has progressed. In TV10, 
the first case, although the ECJ’s reasoning does not show much development from 
earlier broadcasting jurisprudence, the opinion of the Advocate-General indicates 
greater awareness of the scope of Article 10122 and he specifically refers to the earlier 
failure to refer to specific ECHR decisions in the ECJ’s jurisprudence. Connolly 
and, to some extent, RTL, which are both cases post-dating the proclamation of the 
Charter, contain more detailed analyses of the law. The impact of the Charter is, 
however, uncertain. Lindqvist, handed down less than two weeks after RTL, was a 
disappointing judgment in terms of its analysis of freedom of expression, leaving 
difficult questions to the national court. In Cwic, both courts relied on the judgment 
in Connolly, only the Advocate-General discussing the ECtHR jurisprudence. Any 
general statements as to changes in the EU courts’ approach to protection of human 
rights must be subject to caveats.
The EU courts do not, however, always refer to the most relevant ECHR juris-
prudence on the issue in question123 and in some instances seem only to be making 
general statements about the existence and importance of freedom of expression. 
The early case of TV10 is a case in point. Even post-Charter, in de Coster, the 
Advocate-General, rather than referring to cases such as Groppera, which deals 
specifically with the right to receive satellite services, quoted the Sunday Times case 
about the importance of the media in a democratic society. The role of the mass 
media was hardly the central issue in the case. As such, the freedom of expression 
arguments put forward by the Advocate General were not the most appropriate to 
119 Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409. Sacchi subsequently brought an action before the ECtHR 
unsuccessfully.
120 The first broadcasting case in which Article 10 ECHR was mentioned was Case 352/85 Bond van 
Adverteerders [1988] ECR 2085 although the ECJ did not address the issue, dealing with the basis 
of Article 49 EC.
121 Familiapress, supra; Lindqvist, supra.
122 Contrast the earlier Case C-288/89 Stichting Collective Antennevoorziehing Gouda v. Commisaariat 
voor de Media [1991] ECR I-4007 and Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) 
v. Dimotiki Etairia Plirofissis (DEP) [1991] ECR I-2925, but note that in Case C-159/90 SPUC v. 
Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, the Advocate-General did discuss Article 10 in some detail.
123 See e.g. Case C-17/00 de Coster [2001] ECR I-9445; CFI in Connolly; Advocate-General in Cwic, 
supra.
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the decision, nor were they particularly well elaborated. Such an approach hardly 
indicates that the rights based arguments are being addressed in a particularly 
thorough manner. The mere reference by the EU courts to a decision of the ECtHR 
is not itself sufficient to show a similar level of protection between the two systems. 
A similar problem can be identified in Familiapress: the ECJ referred to one ECHR 
case, Lentia,124 and it did not review all relevant cases.
One might argue that, as the ECJ is ruling on Community law, it is under 
no obligation to consider the rulings of a court in an entirely different system. 
Conversely, the ECHR has inspired the European Union’s system of human rights 
protection and the surest way to avoid discrepancies between the two is to refer to 
the relevant judgments of the ECtHR. This may partly be the result of the courts’ 
collegiate approach to judicial drafting. Nonetheless, the EU courts may be criticized 
for failing to give a detailed analysis of the relevant issues where human rights 
issues arise and for sometimes avoiding dealing with the human rights arguments 
entirely. These two points raise slightly different concerns. 
If the EU courts do address the human rights issues, there are a number of pitfalls. 
First, the relevant court may accept that a human right is in issue, but not refer 
specifically to the ECHR and the decisions thereon. Although such a failure does 
not necessarily mean that the level of protection is lower than under the ECHR, 
there is certainly a risk of a divergent approach as the ECJ or CFI develops Union 
standards, designed for and developed by the EU courts in a trade-based context. 
The development of a Union standard can be seen for example in the CFI’s ap-
proach in Connolly and RTL, although it must be noted that RTL is unusual for the 
rigour of its analysis and the fact that it specifically referred to the Charter. If the 
EU courts refer to inappropriate case law, again the danger of inconsistent ruling 
arises. Further, once introduced into the Community acquis, it could be difficult to 
eradicate the divergence, especially if EU courts continue to refer, as the ECJ did in 
RTL, Karner and Cwic, to ‘Union’ rulings, rather than Strasbourg cases. Similarly, 
the analysis of the Advocate-General in Karner relies heavily on the Opinion in 
the Tobacco Advertising Directive case, perhaps because it constituted one of the 
few, thorough considerations of ECtHR decisions and the issue of proportionality 
in EC case-law. The issue may have repercussions for the relationship between the 
EU courts and ECtHR. In Bosphorus Airways, the ECtHR held that EC law can 
be considered equivalent to ECHR, unless ‘manifestly deficient’.125 The majority 
did not discuss what was meant by this term, but Judge Ress suggested that this 
test would require the EU courts to follow ECtHR established principles and ‘be 
under an obligation to consider whether there was already an interpretation or an 
application of the Convention which was already the subject of ECHR case law’. 
This approach suggests that the original ECHR case law itself should be used, as 
otherwise it might be difficult to identify the precise scope of a right, especially in 
124 Lentia, supra.
125 Bosphorus Airways para. 156.
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circumstances where the ECHR view of a particular right has been developed at 
the level of principle and as regards practical application.
Secondly, problems may also arise where the human rights aspect is not expressly 
addressed, addressed only by the Advocate-General, or dismissed summarily. As 
noted, the lack of express reference to the decisions of the ECtHR does not neces-
sarily mean that the standards are lower. Indeed one might argue that the EU courts 
are seeking to integrate human rights issues into the substantive Community law, 
whether as a limitation of a Treaty provision126 or by defining its scope.127 On this 
basis, Union standards would be ECHR standards under a different name.128 As 
has been noted, it would be simplistic to suggest that Union law is concerned only 
with trade issues.129 Nonetheless, there are problems with this argument. 
Although in some cases freedom of expression and Treaty freedoms might 
point to the same conclusion, for example in the case of cross-order advertising, 
the analysis is rarely that simple. An approach in which human rights issues are 
not directly addressed hardly indicates that protection of human rights is as a 
matter of principle given a high priority. Even where they are addressed, if rights 
arguments are seen as just one argument out of many, rights protection may not be 
given the weight it deserves whether this be in terms of the reasoning used or, and 
as a possible consequence, in terms of outcome. In Montecatini, for example, it is 
somewhat worrying that the ECJ did not consider whether there might have been 
a prima facie interference with the rights in issue, but one that was justified under 
Articles 10(2) and 11(2). Following the ECJ’s reasoning, which seemingly limits 
the protection awarded by Article 10 ECHR to legal activities, in other contexts 
could allow authorities to stifle dissent by making the expressions expressed illegal. 
This sort of reasoning underpinned the CFI’s approach in Connolly. Further, in a 
number of the broadcasting cases, such as ProSieben, TV10 and de Coster, the 
decision was framed in terms of Article 49 and the freedom to provide services, even 
where the Advocate-General had considered the human rights-based argument.130 
Sometimes the public interest (freedom of expression) was outweighed by the 
126 Contrast reasoning in Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress, supra, with the earlier cases of 
Cases 60 and 61/84 Cinetheque SA v. Federation Nationale de Cinemas Francaises [1985] ECR 
2605 regarding competence to review national legislation for compliance with human rights 
requirements.
127 See by analogy Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, discussed 
further below.
128 Judge Ress in his Concurring Opinion in Bosphorus Airways, supra, seems to recognise this 
possibility, para. 2.
129 Weatherill, S., ‘The Internal Market’ in Peers, S., and Ward, A., (eds) The EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004).
130 See de Coster, supra; see also Tobacco Advertising Directive case, supra.
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economic freedom.131 Often freedom of expression arguments occur as a limitation 
on the economic freedom (or on both sides of the argument), making it difficult 
to suggest that all aspects of freedom of expression are adequately protected by 
an analysis of the economic freedom. Even if it is likely that the same conclusion 
would be reached on each approach, it is hard to know that this is a ‘rights-friendly’ 
outcome without going into a human rights based analysis.132 It should be noted, 
however, that in these cases the Advocate-General and court have not differed in 
their ultimate conclusions.
The cases so far have concerned a discussion of the merits; a prior problem 
concerns jurisdiction of the courts. There are two problems. The first is where the 
substance of the argument is held not to fall within the EU courts’ jurisdiction. The 
classic example of this was Grogan in which the ECJ did not discuss freedom of 
expression because the elements of a service for the purposes of Article 49 EC were 
not satisfied. This decision was heavily criticized; it seems to have been a limited 
approach to the determination of a ‘service’ which has not re-occurred, although it 
should be noted that will always be limits to the EU courts’ competence, as with any 
court.133 The other major problem is that of standing and in this we can see a clear 
difference in the position of individuals under the preliminary rulings procedure 
(Article 234)134 and those seeking judicial review of a Community act (Article 
230). The most recent collection of judicial review cases, noted in brief, show how 
difficult it is for non-privileged applications to show locus standi; indeed the EU 
courts have been criticized for taking an overly restrictive approach to this issue.135 
Individuals’ substantive arguments of whatever nature are not as a consequence 
considered, potentially leaving rights ill-protected. It has been suggested that 
the courts’ approach to locus standi is part of a general unwillingness to accept 
challenges to Community actions: the differences between the different types of 
jurisdiction exercised by the EU courts in relation to the value ascribed to freedom 
of expression is discussed further below.
131 Arguably this is the result in Familiapress, supra. Certainly this is the case in a number of 
broadcasting cases not discussed in this review either because they are too old, such as Mediawet, 
supra, or because they did not directly refer to freedom of expression although cultural policy issues 
were engaged: see e.g. Case C-11/95 Commission v. Belgium [1996] ECR I-4115; Case C-211/91 
Commission v. Belgium [1992] ECR I-6757; see in a different context the same point being made: 
Case T-266/97 Vlaamse Televisie Maatschappij NV v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2329.
132 This is particularly striking in the case of TV10 in which the Advocate-General identified relevant 
ECtHR jurisprudence which was not discussed at all by the ECJ. 
133 In respect of the ECtHR see e.g. Segi and Gestoras Pro-Amnistia v. Fifteen Member States, 
application 6422/02 and 9916/02, ECHR 2002-V. 
134 On the adequacy of Article 234 EC, note that it is the competent court which makes the references; 
the matter is not in the control of the parties.
135 Contrast views of CFI, Advocate-General and ECJ in Jego Quere & Cie v. Commission [2002] ECR 
II-2365 (CFI); on appeal Case C-263/02P, [2004] ECR I-3425 (ECJ) and Case C-50/00P Union de 
Pequenos Agricultores v. Council [2002] ECR I-6677.
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Another general question is whether the differences in approach, as illustrated by 
the Opinion in Tobacco Advertising, RTL and Karner on the issue of proportionality, 
can be categorized by the type of case in which the issues arise. Objective differ-
ences in the role of the courts can be seen depending on whether a preliminary 
ruling, enforcement action or judicial review case in issue. To a certain extent 
responsibility for the protection of rights in preliminary reference cases must be 
divided between the national courts and ECJ which might explain some differences. 
In Familiapress, for example, the ECJ seems vague about the scope of Article 
10, leaving the national courts to deal with the issue.136 The same problem seems 
not to have arisen in other preliminary reference cases, however, irrespective of 
their age.137 One might question in such cases where the national court is given 
vague guidance, whether the ECJ can be said to be protecting the rights rather than 
devolving responsibility for their protection on the national court. Other difficulties 
occur irrespective of the type of jurisdiction. 
A linked question is whether the EU courts give greater attention to human 
rights claims when they seek to limit member States’ actions or extend Community 
competence. The EU courts have been reluctant to accept freedom of expression 
arguments as justifying restriction of Treaty freedoms, TV10 and Schmidberger138 
being the only examples.139 TV10 is a case in which the company benefiting from 
the freedom to provide services was using EC law to evade national regulation 
and, as such, might be deemed to fall within a different stream of jurisprudence, 
that relating to anti-avoidance of national law.140 Schmidberger is also unusual, as 
it does not involve a direct infringement by State action but liability arising from 
State inaction, and might therefore be seen as involving a weaker type of trade right. 
In other cases in which member States have tried to use freedom of expression to 
justify a limitation on a Treaty provision, the ECJ although accepting the principle 
has been less open to national rules in practice, often directly suggesting that they 
were disproportionate. 
So far, the cases identified have been located in a simple trade versus freedom 
of expression context. Freedom of expression does not always operate in this way. 
In Familiapress, for example, the impact of the rights based argument was less 
clear-cut as it was used, in different versions, by both sides to the dispute; that 
is, it could operate to support the economic right as well as to restrict it. There 
the ECJ gave little guidance to the national court as to what factors it should take 
136 See also Lindqvist, supra.
137 Mediawet, although outside the scope of this review; Karner, supra.
138 Schmidberger, supra.
139 The advertising cases have tended to involve harmonising measures and may therefore be considered 
a different category, as discussed further below.
140 Rehberg, ‘Inspire Art – freedom of establishment for companies in Europe between “abuse” and 
national regulatory concerns’ 1 EU LF (2004) 1; Hansen ‘The Development of the Circumvention 
principle in the Area of Broadcasting’ 25 LIEI (1998/2) 111.
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into account in determining the scope of Article 10, although the ECJ did suggest 
the rule was disproportionate in its impact on the economic freedoms. A similar 
approach can be seen in Lindqvist, in which two fundamental rights, freedom of 
expression and the right to privacy, were in issue on different sides of the case 
and in which it was left to the national court, with little help from the ECJ, to 
determine whether the national rules in issue were proportionate.141 The lack of 
direction might also give rise to an increased risk of the resulting decision of the 
national court being inconsistent with the ECtHR’s rulings and would seem to run 
contrary to the requirement in Kremzow, to which the ECJ has expressly alluded 
in other decisions.142 At any rate, the responsibility for reconciling tensions would 
fall to the national court.
RTL is an example of another type of case; that where Community legislation 
is in issue.143 Unlike Lindqvist, the freedom of expression argument is used to try 
to limit member States’ freedom to take action. Arguably, freedom of expression 
in such circumstances would be likely to receive such support. The ECJ accepted 
that the measures were proportionate despite the fact that the measures imposed 
limitations on the right to provide services, or the free movement of goods, as well 
as on freedom of expression. Note, however, that irrespective of questions about the 
type of speech in issue, the regulation introduced by the Member State has already 
been approved through Community action – the member States in these cases are 
implementing the Community policy. From this it seems that freedom of expression 
arguments will be unlikely to be successful when they are used to justify derogating 
from a Treaty freedom or to undermine a harmonized standard: in both instances 
Community policy is hard to outweigh on non-trade grounds.144 The ECJ will be 
much more cautious, irrespective of whether a Treaty provision or harmonizing 
measure is in issue, when human rights arguments are put forward by both sides; 
in the relevant preliminary reference cases it has, indeed, avoided coming to clear 
conclusions on the matter. One might suggest that in such complex situations, the 
ECJ will seek to deal with the questions by traditional EC principles,145 as it did 
in Familiapress, where the clearest direction to the national court is based on a 
two-prong proportionality test focussing on the impact on trade, or by leaving it 
to the referring court, as it did in Lindqvist.
141 The ECJ has been equally forthright regarding disproportionality in a number of cases regarding 
broadcasting regulation, not included either because of their age (Mediawet) or because they are 
dealt with as cultural policy without considering issues of freedom of expression – see cases noted 
supra.
142 Most recently, Karner, supra.
143 See also Karner, supra.
144 Note that the one case where a directive was successfully challenged, the ECJ based its decision on 
Treaty base rather than freedom of expression: see Tobacco Advertising Directive case, supra.
145 In this there might be similarities with the ECJ’s attempts to sidestep difficult issues in Grogan, 
supra.
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As regards challenges to Community action, although some claims have been 
upheld, this has not been on human rights grounds.146 In two of the three cases 
in which the freedom of expression point has been directly addressed by the EU 
courts, Connolly and Montecatini, the challenges were unsuccessful; Cwic being 
the exception. Although there might be a temptation to try to develop these cases 
into generalizations, suggesting that there is no successful example of a freedom 
of expression-based challenge to Community action, the problem is that there are 
so few cases where the ECJ actually addresses the issue directly. It is dangerous 
to draw firm conclusions based on such little evidence.
Moving on to look at the substance of freedom of expression, there are a number 
of cases in which the EU courts have considered Article 10 and relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. In most instances, the EU courts have not expressly considered the 
scope of freedom of expression; perhaps because the cases fall centrally within its 
normally accepted scope. Certainly, the ECJ has not expressly excluded categories 
of expression. On this basis, ignoring Montecatini the reasoning of which is unclear, 
the EU courts’ approach to freedom of expression is broad, reflecting the approach 
of the ECtHR. Indeed, in some of the broadcasting cases and Familiapress, the 
ECJ has suggested that licensing is necessary to create freedom of expression.147 
The reasoning behind this is that broadcasting regulation based solely on the 
market place of ideas drowns out the weaker groups.148 On this view, the scope of 
Article 10 as protected by the ECJ is broader than that as seen by the ECtHR.149 
The ECtHR seems to view broadcasting licences as restrictions on freedom of 
expression, albeit restrictions that are usually justified. The position is, however, 
less clear: in some cases cultural policy and issues of broadcasting diversity have 
been detached from questions relating to freedom of expression. Moreover in 
RTL, the ECJ considered advertising regulations to be justified restrictions.150 
Given the different approaches to the scope of freedom of expression, it is ironic 
that the ECtHR allows States in practice greater freedom to regulate the broadcast 
media than the ECJ. It seems that there is a certain margin of appreciation in the 
146 In the Tobacco Advertising case, supra, for example, the ECJ ruled against the institutions and 
limited Community competence though not on the basis of freedom of expression.
147 Contrast earlier views, Commission Green Paper, supra.
148 See e.g. Ingber, ‘The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth’ Duke Law Journal (1984) 1. 
Another consideration might be that companies do not enjoy ‘full’ rights to freedom of expression 
that are based on personal development, but instead enjoy only instrumental rights that should be 
exercised in the interests of democracy.
149 Another difference might arise in relation to the question of whether freedom of expression implies 
the right to information; see e.g. Hautala, supra.
150 RTL, supra; contrast views of Advocate-General.
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assessment of licensing regimes151 not apparent in the services jurisprudence.152 
We might go further: the freedom of information cases may indicate another area 
in which the EU position is broader than that of the ECtHR and reminds us that 
the EU is not limited to the rights protected by the ECHR.153 Indeed the Charter, 
which the first of these cases pre-dated, also provides such a right and includes 
many socio-economic rights not incorporated in the ECHR.
A couple of further points relating to the scope of the right might be noted. The 
EU courts have never analyzed the relationship of freedom of expression to linked 
rights, such as freedom of association.154 This might be a lawyers’ point, given the 
similarity of the derogation provisions, rather than an issue impeding individuals’ 
ability to exercise their rights. A lack of analysis can similarly be seen regarding the 
nature of the beneficiaries of the right; the EU courts have considered freedom of 
expression in the context of companies as well as individuals. This would indicate 
a similarity of approach between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts in relation 
to the scope of Article 10(1). 
More worrying is the fact that the EU courts do not seem to appreciate the distinc-
tion between different types of speech within Article 10 ECHR.155 In Schmidberger 
the fact that political speech was in issue was an irrelevance, the key factor was 
the motive of the member State. A similar disregard for the nature of speech can 
be seen in Connolly, especially in the views of the CFI. In some, but not all, recent 
advertising cases,156 the ECJ has paid more attention to the commercial nature of 
the speech. Might we think it worrying that the EU courts have considered types of 
speech only when it operates to lower levels of protection to the speaker? One might 
suggest that this approach arises out of the fact that, to fall within Community law 
in the first place, some sort of commercial element is required and that therefore 
all Community cases concerned commercial speech. Two comments may be made 
151 See e.g. United Christian Broadcasters, supra.
152 Mediawet; this is apparent in the other cases concerning cultural policy and broadcasting regulation, 
supra. 
153 Note that the ECtHR also has recourse to what is common in the signatory states, this is often in 
terms of determining appropriate restrictions and the margin of appreciation.
154 See e.g. Schmidberger, supra.
155 Interestingly, in the Tobacco Advertising case, supra, the Advocate-General, as an exception to the 
general rule, noted:
 ‘personal rights are recognised as being fundamental in character, not merely because of 
their instrumental, social functions, but also because they are necessary for the autonomy, 
dignity and personal development of individuals. Thus, individuals’ freedom to promote 
commercial activities derives not only from their right to engage in economic activities and 
the general commitment, in the Community context, to a market economy based upon free 
competition, but also from their inherent entitlement as human beings freely to express and 
receive views on any topic, including the merits of the goods and the services which they 
market or purchase.’
156 Contrast RTL and Karner, supra.
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in response to this argument. The ECtHR has been criticized for not looking into 
whether so-called commercial speech may in fact be speech on a matter of public 
interest; nonetheless, that Court has accepted that speech made in a commercial 
context may still be political speech. Newspapers, for example, are commercial 
entities. They have, however, been recognized by the ECtHR as being essential to 
the functioning of democracy and any restrictions on freedom of expression will be 
subject to close scrutiny. On this basis, one might have political speech within the 
Community even if, for Community law to apply, it must have some commercial 
context.157 Secondly, one case in which the CFI and ECJ discussed the margin of 
appreciation, Connolly, which involved the duties of a civil servant is hardly the 
most commercial of contexts. The argument is therefore not convincing. 
More problems arise at a number of levels. The first is a general problem, 
relating to the relationship between the two legal orders. This is an issue that has 
been raised before, but is still significant: what weight does freedom of expression 
carry in relation to the four freedoms and other economic rights contained in the EC 
Treaty? One question is whether Treaty freedoms be considered ‘rights of others’ 
within the context of Article 10(2), are the restrictions they impose on freedom of 
expression proportionate? Despite the arguably wide scope of this phrase under 
the Convention jurisprudence, the EU courts have not addressed this point. More 
generally, although some recent cases take a human rights-friendly view, in much 
of the jurisprudence, including the case of Karner,158 the question has been whether 
fundamental rights affect trade freedoms. A number of points could be made. It 
means the balancing of competing interests does not take place within a human 
rights framework, which the ‘“rights of others” approach’ would permit. Further, 
raising the question this way prioritizes trade freedoms over fundamental rights, 
which might well affect the final determination of the case, especially where. 
proportionality has been judged by reference to the measure’s impact on trade. 
Although this has been much criticized, given the EU courts are formed by the EU 
framework, the choice is hardly surprising. 
The EU courts have not adopted a consistent position as to how they view 
fundamental rights in general.159 Are they derogations (and implicitly then in the 
province of the Member States) or more general principles affecting the interpreta-
tion of the Treaty and thus forming a real part of the Community legal order? If we 
discount the suggestion discussed above that the blurring of the boundary between 
the ‘Strasbourg method’ and that of the economic freedoms constitutes an attempt to 
incorporate ECHR standards into substantive Community law, many cases suggest 
that arguments concerning human rights should be seen as a derogation from Treaty 
freedoms. Two cases run counter to this trend: Schmidberger and Karner.
157 See e.g. Schmidberge, Montecatini, supra.
158 Karner, supra, para. 82.
159 See Mediawet, Familiapress, and contrast Schmidberger, supra.
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The ECJ’s decision in Schmidberger is curious. It did not equate the fundamental 
freedoms with the specific Treaty derogation found in Article 30 or with the man-
datory requirements. Can one argue that the ECJ has seen human rights as some 
form of horizontal, general limitation (albeit one still subject to proportionality 
test) justifying Member State action, or that human rights operate to affect the 
definition of the scope of free movement rights at an earlier stage in the analysis, 
that is the determination of whether there is a restriction in the first place? The ECJ 
has taken such an interpretive approach in relation to protection of the environment 
in one case: PreussenElektra.160 There it considered the reasons for the national 
measure, environmental protection, and concluded in the light of those aims that 
the national measure did not constitute a restriction on free movement, rather than 
finding a restriction and then seeking to justify it. In doing so, the ECJ noted the 
importance of environmental protection both within the EU and in international 
law. This is significant because such an approach indicates that environmental 
protection considerations shape trade-freedoms rather than being seen as a limited 
exception to them. Given the Union is founded on respect for the ECHR, one might 
have thought that such an approach could also be justified here. 
Schmidberger might be open to interpretation on this point, but Karner makes 
an important departure. In Karner, freedom of expression was considered as a 
free-standing issue, and not limited to the context of derogating from a Treaty 
freedom. The ECJ held that neither Article 28 nor 49 precluded the rules; derogation 
is not therefore an issue. Nonetheless, the ECJ discussed freedom of expression 
because the case fell within the scope of Community law. Although this introduces 
another limitation on Member States’ freedom to act when specific provisions of 
Community law do not preclude the relevant provisions, it is not an extension of 
Community competence. The Karner approach could suggest that human rights 
might constitute a more general part of the fabric of the Union legal order. As yet, 
however, it is an isolated case.
Despite this possible improvement in the status of human rights arguments, and 
freedom of expression in particular, within the Union legal order, other problems 
remain. There are discrepancies between the interpretation of the three-stage test 
in Article 10(2) adopted by the EU courts and the ECtHR. Although the EU courts 
have addressed proportionality, there has been little consideration of lawfulness, 
though in most cases this requirement is likely to have been satisfied. In a number 
of instances, notably the judicial review cases but also in RTL and, despite the 
opinion of the Advocate-General, in Karner, the EU courts have suggested that a 
measure which is ‘reasonable’ is acceptable from the perspective of Article 10(2). 
This is particularly worrying as RTL and Karner are recent cases. The ECtHR, 
however, has specifically stated that the test is not one of reasonableness.161 Part 
of the problem is the EU courts’ differing approach to questions of proportionality 
160 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paras. 72-81.
161 See Handyside, supra.
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even when the cases concern only EC law;162 the difference in approach seems to 
have bled into cases concerning human rights. It might be mitigated were the EU 
courts to refer to ECHR cases, rather than Community cases on proportionality, 
illustrating again the difficulties arising from blurring of the two systems. 
The weak notion of proportionality can be linked to the ‘margin of appreciation’. 
Worryingly, the ECJ seems to feel that States will have a wide margin of appreciation 
irrespective of the type of speech in issue. We have already noted the weaknesses 
in the EU courts’ approach to different types of speech. Conversely, the ECtHR 
has distinguished between types of speech and allowed States a broader margin of 
appreciation where commercial speech is concerned and rather less where political 
speech is an issue. This would suggest that the case-law of the EU courts and that 
of the ECtHR diverges, with the EU courts giving lower protection to political 
speech than the Strasbourg court does. One final point concerning the margin of 
appreciation is that the ECtHR has justified its use on the basis that the national 
authorities are often in the best position to assess the appropriate response in a 
given situation. Although this reasoning can be transferred to preliminary rulings 
and enforcement actions, it is less appropriate to staff cases and other judicial 
review actions. This throws further doubt on the acceptability of the wide margin 
of appreciation claimed in Connolly.
5. Conclusions
There are two aspects to freedom of expression: the scope of the right, and the 
weight attached to the right. Those aspects can be considered from the perspective 
of the European Union’s internal consistency and then the consistency of the rulings 
of the EU courts with those of the ECtHR. From the foregoing analysis, it would 
seem that the scope of freedom of expression has given rise to little difficulty, 
the ECJ in particular has defined the right broadly. In terms of comparison with 
the ECtHR, the scope of protection is at least as extensive as that granted by that 
court and is, arguably, broader. The difficulty starts when we consider the weight 
attached to freedom of expression, especially when that right conflicts with free 
movement or other economic rights. 
On a positive note, the jurisprudence of the ECJ shows increased exposure to 
freedom of expression arguments, and in some cases, greater sophistication in the 
analysis of the rights to be weighed against it. Some EU judgments have been 
criticized for the way they approach human rights in general, seeing the rights as 
forming part of the derogation from the Treaty freedoms; and, as a corollary, the 
EU courts’ approach to proportionality. The consistency of the ECJ’s approach 
to these issues may be breaking down. Although some cases still view human 
162 Tridimas, T., ‘Proportionality in European Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard 
of Scrutiny’ in Ellis, E., (ed) supra, p. 66.
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rights as derogating principles, in more recent cases they have also been seen as 
countervailing rights to be balanced against economic freedoms. 
There also seems to be uncertainty as to whether cases involving human rights 
arguments should be analyzed within the framework of Community acquis or by 
drawing directly on the decisions of the ECtHR. Although such inconsistency leads 
to some legal uncertainty, it may also reflect a general, albeit uneven, development 
of the EU courts’ jurisprudence in this area, a development which in general 
terms seems to be moving towards a greater degree of interest in the human rights 
arguments. This last point should not be overstated: in addition to inconsistencies 
between the EU courts’ own decisions, there are discrepancies between the approach 
of the EU courts and that of the ECtHR. It has been noted that the courts have not 
always been clear as to whether they should refer directly to ECHR standards and 
jurisprudence. Although mere references to decisions do not in themselves guarantee 
adequate protection, there is a greater likelihood of inadequate protection being 
awarded to freedom expression when the discussion is framed entirely within the 
EU context, given its long history as a trade-based organization. 
Thus, although the EU courts, and particularly the ECJ, seem to be trying hard to 
reconcile their judgments with ECHR requirements, one might question the degree 
to which it is possible for them consistently to provide appropriate protection in 
a system which was designed originally to ensure free trade between the various 
signatory states. All this suggests that the member States should think carefully 
about the judicial protection of human rights within the EU and more particularly 
about the relationship between the EU courts and the ECtHR. From the European 
Constitution which introduced the possibility of the European Union’s accession 
to the ECHR, it may be that some solution, such as a reference or appeal system, 
will be finally introduced. Until that time no doubt controversy will continue about 
the real level of protection provided by the EU courts. One final point seems clear 
from this survey: it is not possible to make ‘big’ statements about the EU courts’ 
approach. Whilst it is not possible to suggest that the EU courts are abusing human 
rights arguments to further Community competence, neither can it be said that they 
are consistent either within their own jurisprudence or with that of the ECtHR.
